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ABSTRACT
Large-scale online password guessing attacks are wide-spread and
continuously qualified as one of the top cyber-security risks. The
common method for mitigating the risk of online cracking is to
lock out the user after a fixed number (K ) of consecutive incorrect
login attempts. Selecting the value of K induces a classic security-
usability trade-off. When K is too large a hacker can (quickly) break
into a significant fraction of user accounts, but when K is too low
we will start to annoy honest users by locking them out after a few
mistakes. Motivated by the observation that honest user mistakes
typically look quite different than the password guesses of an on-
line attacker, we introduce DALock a distribution aware password
lockout mechanism to reduce user annoyance while minimizing
user risk. As the name suggests, DALock is designed to be aware
of the frequency and popularity of the password used for login
attacks while standard throttling mechanisms (e.g., K-strikes) are
oblivious to the password distribution. In particular, DALock main-
tains an extra “hit count" in addition to “strike count" for each user
which is based on (estimates of) the cumulative probability of all
login attempts for that particular account. We empirically evaluate
DALock with an extensive battery of simulations using real world
password datasets. In comparison with the traditional K-strikes
mechanism we find thatDALock offers a superior security/usability
trade-off. For example, in one of our simulations we are able to
reduce the success rate of an attacker to 0.05% (compared to 1%
for the 10-strikes mechanism) whilst simultaneously reducing the
unwanted lockout rate for accounts that are not under attack to
just 0.08% (compared to 4% for the 3-strikes mechanism).
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1 INTRODUCTION
An online password attacker repeatedly attempts to login to an
authentication server submitting a different guess for the target
user’s password on each attempt. The human tendency to pick weak
(“low-entropy”) passwords has been well documented e.g., [5]. An
untargetted online attacker will typically submit the most popular
password choices consistent with the password requirements (e.g.,
“Password1”), while a targetted attacker [53] might additionally
incorporate background knowledge about the specific target user
(e.g., birthdate, phone number, anniversary etc...). To protect user’s
against online attackers most authentication servers incorporate
some form of throttling mechanism. In particular, the K-strikes
mechanism temporarily locks a user’s account if K-consecutive
incorrect passwords are attempted within a predefined time period
(e.g., 24 hours). Setting the lockout parameter K induces a classic
security-usability trade-off. Selecting small values of K (e.g., K = 3)
provides better protection against online attackers, but may result
in many unwanted lockouts when an honest user miss-types (or
miss-remembers) their password. Selecting a larger value of K (e.g.,
K = 10) will reduce the unwanted lockout rate, but may increase
vulnerability to online attacks.
Bonneau et al. [6] considered many proposed replacements for
password authentication finding that all proposals have some draw-
backs compared when compared with passwords. For example,
passwords are easy to revoke unlike biometrics. Similarly, hard-
ware tokens are expensive to deploy and require users to carry
them around. By contrast, passwords are easy to deploy and do not
require users to carry anything around. Put simply we have not
found a “silver bullet” replacement for passwords. Thus, despite
all of their short-comings (and many attempts to replace them)
passwords will likely remain entrenched as the dominant form of
authentication on the internet [26]. Thus, protecting passwords
against online attacks without locking out legitimate users remains
a crucial challenge for the foreseeable future [36, 44, 46].
One approach to protect user’s against online guessing attacks
is to adopt strict password composition policies to prevent user’s
from selecting weak passwords. However, it has been well doc-
umented that users dislike restrictive policies and often respond
in predictable ways [29]. Another defense is to store cookies on
the user’s device to prove that the next login attempt came from
a known device. Similarly, one can also utilize features such as IP
address, geographical location, device and time of day [18, 23, 40]
to help distinguish between malicious and benign login attempts.
While these features can be helpful indicators they are not failproof.
Honest users oftentimes travel and login from different devices at
unusual times. Similarly, an attacker may attempt to mimic login
patterns of legitimate users e.g., using a botnet the online attacker
can submit guesses from a vide variety of IP addresses and geo-
graphical locations.
1.1 Contributions
We introduce DALock, a novel Distribution Aware throttling mech-
anism which can achieve a better balance between usability and
security. The key intuition behind DALock is to base lockout deci-
sions on the popularity of the passwords that are being guessed. An
online attacker will typically want to attempt to login with the most
popular passwords to maximize his chances of success. By contrast,
when an honest user miss types (or miss remembers) his password
he will typically not be globally popular password. In addition to
keeping track of Ku (the number of consecutive incorrect login
attempts), DALock keeps track of a “hit count” Ψu for each user u,
where Ψu intuitively represents the cumulative probability mass of
all incorrect login attempts for user u’s account. When Ψu exceeds
the threshold Ψ we decide to lock the account.
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Example 1: Usability. Figure 1 compares the usability ofDALock
with the standard K = 3 strikes mechanism. In this example sce-
nario our user John Smith registers an account with the somewhat
complicated password “J.S.UsesStr0ngpwd!” based on the story
“John Smith uses a strong password.” Later when he tries to login he
remembers the basic story, but not the exact password. Did he use
his first name and his last name?With or without abbreviation? Did
he add a punctuationmark at the end?Which letters are capitalized?
If we use the 3-Strike mechanism John Smith will be locked out
quickly e.g., after trying the incorrect password guesses “JohnUseS-
trongPassword,” “JohnUsesStrongPassword” and “JohnUsesStrong-
pwd.” However, since none of these passwords are overly popular
DALock would allow our user to continue attempting to login until
he recovers the correct password.
Example 2: Security. Figure 2 comparesDALockwith theK = 10
strike mechanism. In this scenario our user registers an account
with a weak password “letmein.” Because the password is globally
popular it is likely that an online attacker will attempt this pass-
word within the first 10 guesses and break into the user’s account.
By contrast, DALock will quickly lockdown the account after the
attacker submits two globally popular passwords.
We evaluateDALock empirically by simulating an authentication
server in the presence of an online password attacker. We compare
DALock with the the traditional K strikes mechanism for K ∈
{3, 10}. Our experiments show that when the hit count threshold Ψ
is tuned appropriately that DALock significantly outperforms our
K-strike mechanisms. In particular, when user accounts are under
attack we find that the fraction of accounts that are compromised
is significantly lower for DALock than either K strikes mechanism
— even for the strict K = 3 strikes policy. We also evaluate the
unwanted lockout rate of user accounts which are not under attack.
We find that the unwanted lockout rate for DALock is much lower
compare to K = 3-strikes mechanism. The unwanted lockout rate
for DALock and the more lenient K = 10-strikes mechanism were
comparable. A more detailed description of our experiments can be
found in section 6.
To deploy DALock we need a way to estimate the frequency of
each incorrect login attempt to updateΨu . We propose twomethods
for doing this: password strength meters (e.g. ZXCVBN[54]) and a
differentially private count sketch data structure. Our empirical ex-
periments showDALock outperforms traditional lockout mechisms
with either approach. However, DALock performs best when we
instantiate with a differentially private count sketch. On a positive
note we show that even if the differentially private count sketch is
trained on a small subset of user passwords that the estimates will
still be high enough for DALock to be effective.
2 RELATEDWORKS AND BACKBROUNDS
2.1 Authentication Throttling
K-strike Mechanism K-strike mechanism is a straight-forrward
implementation for authentication throttling. As its name suggests,
throttling occurs when K consecutive incorrect login attempts are
detected. To reduce the cost of expensive overhead caused by un-
wanted throttling, Brostoff [7] et.al suggest setting thresholdK to be
10 instead of 3. They argue the increment risk is limited when strong
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password policy is enforced. However, this argument is challenged
by empirical analyses of password composition policies [29][4].
Many password composition policies do not rule out all low en-
tropy password choices. For instance, it turns out that banning
dictionary words does not increase entropy as expected. [29]
Feature-Based Mechanism To improve performance, modern
throttling mechanisms[40][23] often times use features such geo-
graphical location, IP-address, device information, and etc in addi-
tion to the correctness of attempting password. These features can
be used to train sophisticated machine learning models to help dis-
tinguish betweenmalicious and benign login attempts [18].DALock
takes an orthogonal approach and relies instead on the popularity
of the password guesses. One can combine those models with a
rigious throttling system for a better performance.
Password-Distribution Aware Throttling In an independent
line of work Tian et al. [56] developed an IP-based throttling mech-
anism which exploits differences between the distribution of honest
login attempts and attacker guesses. In particular, they propose to
“silently block” login attempts from a particular IP address a if the
system detects too many popular passwords being submitted from
that IP address. In more detail StopGuessing uses a data-structure
called the binomial ladder filter [42] to (approximately) track the
frequency F (p) of each incorrect password guess. For each IP ad-
dress the StopGuessing protocol maintains an associated counter
Ia =
∑
p∈P
F (p) where P is a list of incorrect password guesses that
have been (recently) submitted from that IP address — Ia can be
updated without storing P explicitly. Intuitively (and oversimplify-
ing a bit) if Ia > T then login attempts from address a are silently
blocked i.e., even if the attacker (or honest user) submits a correct
password the system will respond that authentication fails. The
authors also suggest protecting accounts with weak passwords by
setting a user specific threshold T (F (up )) based on the strength
F (up ) of the password pwu of user u. Now if Ia > T (F (up )) then
the system will silently reject any password from address a. Both
StopGuessing and DALock exploit differences between the distri-
bution of user passwords and attacker guesses. One of the key
difference is that StopGuessing focuses on identifying malicious IP
addresses (by maintaining a score Ia ) while DALock focuses on pro-
tecting individual accounts by maintaining a “hit-count” parameter
Ψu for each user u. There are several other key differences between
the two approaches. First, in DALock the goal of our frequency
oracle (e.g., count-sketch, password strength meter) is to estimate
the total fraction of users who have actually selected that particular
password — as opposed to estimating the frequency with which
that password has been recently submitted as a incorrect guess.
Second, DALock does not require silent blocking of login attempts
which could create usability concerns if an honest user is silently
blocked when they enter the correct password.
2.2 Passwords
Password Distribution Password distribution naturally repre-
sents the chance of success in the setting of statcial guessing at-
tacks. Password distribution has been extensively studied since
last decades[17][32]. Using leaked password corpora[39][31][5] is
a straight forward way to describe the distribution of passwords.
In recent works of Wang et al. [50–52] argue that password distri-
butions follows Zipf’s law i.e., leaked password corpora nicely fit
Zipf’s law distributions. Blocki et al. [3] later found that Zipf’s law
nicely fits the Yahoo! password frequency corpus [2, 5].
Password Typos To test the usability of DALock, it’s crucial to
reasonably simulate users’ mistakes. Recent studies[11, 12] from
Chatterjee et. al have summarized probabilities of making (various
of) typos when one enters his or her password based on users’ stud-
ies. Based on the empirically measured data, they purposed two
typo-tolerant authentication without sacrificing security. If fact,
such mechanism has already been deployed in industry[57][20].
2.3 Eliminating Dictionary Attacks
Increasing Cost of Authentcation Pinkas and Sanders [37] pro-
posed the use of puzzles (e.g., proofs of work or CAPTCHAs) as
a way to throttle online password crackers. CAPTCHAs are hard
AI challenges meant to distinguish people from bots [48]. For ex-
ample, reCAPTCHA [49] has been widely deployed in online web
services such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, CNN, and etc. Assum-
ing that CAPTCHAs are only solvable by people, one can mitigate
automated online dictionary attacks without freezing users’ ac-
counts [8, 9]. However, an attacker can always pay humans to
solve these CAPTCHA challenges[38]. Increasingly sophisticated
CAPTCHA solvers [19, 55] powered by neural networks make it
increasingly difficult to design CAPTCHA puzzles that are also
easy for a human to solve. Golla et al. [21] proposed a fee-based
password verification system where a small deposit is necessary to
authenticate, which is refunded after successful authentication. A
password cracker risks loosing its deposit if it is not able to guess
the real password.
Eliminating Popular Passwords One mediation for dictionary
attacks is eliminating the existence of weak or popular passwords.
Schechter et. al [41] show that it is possible to forbid the existence
of over popular password by maintaining the password distribution
securely. Industrial solutions such as “Have I been pwned?" [25]
and “Password CheckUp" [45] " prevent users to choose weak pass-
words based on data breaches. Password strength meters such as
ZXCVBN [54] are also been widely deployed to help users choosing
stronger passwords.
2.4 Privacy Perserving Aggregate Statistics
Releasing.
DALock relies on the distribution of passwords to perform throt-
tling. Storing/Releasing aggregate statistics naively often causes
privacy leakage [34] [35]. To answer the challenge, Cynthia Dwork
purposed Differential Privacy [15] for aggregated data releasing.
Informally speaking, differential private algorithm makes powerful
adversaries unable of telling the existence of a record in the dataset.
We defer the formal definition of differential privacy to section
3.2. Blocki et.al released the statics of Yahoo! dataset consist of
70 millions of passwords. [2]. Recent work by Naor et at [33] also
demonstrates that releasing the distribution of password privately
is feasible. In industry, Differential Privacy has been considered as
the golden tool for various of tasks [16, 27, 43].
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Count Sketch
Count (Median) Sketch [10] and it’s variants are widely in the
tasks for finding frequent items such as popular passwords [33],
homepage settings [16], and frequently used chat emojis [27]. In
this work, we uses CS as a tool for password popularity estimation.
Formally speaking, we define Count Sketch as follows
Definition 3.1 (Count Sketch [13] [10]). A Count Sketch of state
σ : Rd×w × R is represented by a two-dimensional d × w array
counts CS, a total frequency counter CS.T, and d + 1 hash func-
tions (h1, . . . ,hd ,h±) chosen uniformly at random from a pairwise-
independent family.
h1 · · ·hd : {pw} → {1 · · ·w}
h± : {pw} → {1,−1}
In this work we consider the following four classic APIs for
Count Sketch: initialize, Add, Estimate, and TotalFreq. Addition-
ally, we consider an extra operation DP which is used to construct
differentially private Count Sketch from a standard one.
σ0 ← Initialize(d,w) : This API initialize and return a Count
Sketch of state 0d×w × 0, i.e. an all zero table.
σnew ← Add(pw,σ ): Add operation updates the stored frequency
count password pw based on a CS state σ , and outputs the updated
state σnew .
In addiition, given a multiset DU = {pw1, ...,pwdN }, we use
the following notation σDU = Add(DU ,σ )
= Add(pw1,Add({pw2, ...,pwN },σ ) to ease presentation. Further
more, we omit subscriptU and simply use σ to denote σDU .
Estimate(pw,σ ) : This interface returns the estimated frequency
of password pw based on the given Count Sketch State σ .
To implement DALock with high accuracy, we want the esti-
mator has the following correctness Property: Estimate(pw,σ ) ≈
F (pw,DU ).
TotalFreq(σ ) : This opeartion returns the total number of pass-
words based on state σ .
Based on the above definition, we denote the estimated popularity
of password pw by σ with p(pw,σ ) = Estimate(pw,σ )TotalFreq(σ ) . For the rest of
discussions, we sometimes omit σ when there is no ambiguity to
simplify presentation. e.g. p(pw) = p(pw,σ ). In addition, we allow
the above APIs to take a set of passwords as argument and return
the summed results. i.e.. p(S) =
∑
pw ∈S
p(S).
σdp ← DP(ϵ,σ ) :This function outputs an differentially private
state σdp of σ with privacy budget ϵ .
3.2 Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy [15] is one of the industrial golden standard
tools for private aggregated statical releasing. Intuitively speaking,
individual record has limited impact on computing the final results
to be published if one applies differential. For instance, consider the
following two password datasets: A password datasetDU consists
of users’ passwords , and it’s neighboring datasetDU−pwu obtained
by removing user u’s password pwu fromDU . Differential privacy
guarantees that with high probability the published results based on
DU and DU−pwu are the same. Therefore, adversary is not able
to infer the existence of u in dataset DU .
In this work, we adopt differential privacy Count Sketch to re-
duce the risk of privacy leakage. Based on the our notion of Count
Sketch, one can define differential privacy as follows
Definition 3.2 (ϵ-Differential Privacy [15]). A randomized mecha-
nismM gives ϵ-differential privacy if for any pair of neighboring
datasets DU and D ′U , and any σ ∈ Range(M),
Pr [M(DU ) = σ ] ≤ eϵ · Pr
[M(D ′U ) = σ ] .
We consider two datasetsDU and D ′ to be neighbors i.f.f. either
DU = D ′U + pwu or D ′U = D + pwu , where DU + pwu denotes
the dataset resulted from adding the tuple pwu (a new password)
to the dataset DU . We use DU ≃ D ′U to denote two neighboring
datasets. This protects the privacy of any single tuple, because
adding or removing any single tuple results in eϵ -multiplicative-
bounded changes in the probability distribution of the output. If
any adversary can make certain inference about a tuple based on
the output, then the same inference is also likely to occur even if
the tuple does not appear in the dataset.
Laplace Mechanism. The Laplace mechanism is a classic tool
achieve differential privacy. It computes a differential private state σ
on the datasetDU by adding a random noise. The magnitude of the
noise depends on GSσ , the global sensitivity or the L1 sensitivity of
σ . GSσ quantify the maximum impact on σ by adding or removing
any record.
Differentially Private Count Sketch Given a CS of state σ ,
adding (removing) any password pwu to(from) it can result in at
most d + 1 changes for l1 norm. Because each pwu contributes to d
entries in the d ×w table and total count. Therefore, To release σ
with privacy budget ϵ , it suffices to add Lap(d+1ϵ ) to all entries in
σ .
Privacy-Preserving Password Corpus Relasing Mechanism
Naor et.al[33] purposed an algorithm to release password distribu-
tion using local differential privacy. In our work, we focused on
a centralized version of differential privacy which is expected to
have less noisy compare to local setting. StopGuessing[56] uses
a binomial ladder to identify “heavy hitters” (popular passwords),
though the data-structure does not provide any formal privacy
guarantees such as differential privacy. The data-structure is not
suitable for DALock as it provides a binary classification i.e., either
the password is a “heavy hitter” or it is not. For DALock requires a
more fine grained estimate of a passwords popularity.
3.3 Notation Summary
In this section, we summarize frequently used notations in this
paper across all sections in Table 1. For a password pw ∈ P we use
P (pw) to denote the probability each user selects the password pw .
We assume that there is some underyling distribution over user
passwords and use P (pw) to denote the probability of the password
pw ∈ P. It will be convenient to assume that all passwords P =
{pw1,pw2, . . .} are sorted in descending order of probability i.e., so
that P (pw1) ≥ P (pw2) . . .. We will use pwr = P (pwr ) to denote
the probability of the r th most likely password in the distribution.
We useU = {u1, . . . ,uN } to denote a set of N users and DU ⊆
P is a multiset of user passwords i.e.,DU = {pwu1 , . . . ,pwuN }. We
typically view DU as N independent samples from an underlying
distribution over P and write F (pw,DU ) =
{i : pwui = pw} to
denote the number of times the password pw was observed in our
sample. We often omit DU when the dataset is clear from context
and simply write F (pw).
We remark that P (pw) = E[F(pw,DU )]N and thus for popular
passwords we expect that the estimate P (pw) ≈ F(pw,DU )N will be
accurate for sufficiently large N . However, because the underlying
password distribution is unknown and an authentication server
cannot store a plaintext encoding of DU we will often use other
techniques to estimate P (pw) and/or F (pw,DU ). In particular, we
consider a Count (Median) Sketch data structure CS trained on
DU (or a small subsample of DU ) which allows us to generate an
estimate p(pw) for the popularity of each password. Similarly, we
can also use password strength meters to estimate P (pw).
4 THE DALOCKMECHANISM
In this section, we present the DALock mechanism, discuss how
DALock might be implemented and the strategies that an attacker
might use when DALock is deployed. Intuitively, DALock punishes
incorrect password guesses more harshly if the guessed password
pw is overly popular since an attacker will want to submit popular
Notation Description
A Adversary
U The set ofUsers
u A user u ∈ U
P The set of all potential user Passwords
DU ⊆ P a multiset of N sampled passwords for
users u1, . . . ,uN ∈ U
pwu User u’s password
pwr The r ’th most likely password in DU ⊆ P
CS Count (Median) Sketch data structure
F (pw,DU ) Frequency of password pw in dataset DU
P (pw) Empirical probability of password pw
Estimate(pw) Estimated frequency of password pw
p(pw) Estimated probability of password pw
Ψ Hit count threshold
Ψu Remainining hit count threshold of user u.
The account gets locked out if Ψu reaches Ψ
K traditional K-strike threshold.
Ku Remaining strike threshold on u’s account.
The account gets locked if KU exceeds K .
Table 1: Notation Summary
password guesses to maximize his chances of cracking the user
password.
4.1 DALock
In the classic K-strike throttling mechanism we keep track of a
parameter Ku which tracks the number of consecutive incorrect
login attempts for each useru. After each consecutive login attempt
the parameter is Ku and the parameter Ku is reset to 0 whenever u
authenticates successfully. If we ever have Ku ≥ K then throttling
mechanism kicks in and the authentication server will lock down
the account until the user takes some action1.
The key-idea behindDALock is to additionally maintain an extra
“hit count” variable Ψu for each user u. Intuitively, Ψu measures the
total probability mass of all incorrect password guesses submitted
for user u. Initially, when a new user registers we will have Ψu = 0
(and Ku = 0). After each attempted login with an incorrect pass-
wordpw , pwu the hit count is incremented so that Ψu+ = p(()pw).
Here, p(()pw) denotes an estimate for the probability of the pass-
word pw so that incorrect passwords are punished more severely
when pw is an overly popular password. Unlike the consecutive
strikes parameter Ku which is reset to 0 after each successful login,
the hit count parameter can only be incremented. DALock throttles
u’s account if the “hit count” exceeds Ψ (i.e., Ψu ≥ Ψ) or if there are
too many consecutive mistakes (i.e., Ku ≥ K ) For example, suppose
that the (estimated) probability of the passwords “aaa," “bbb" and
“ccc” were 3%, 1.7% and 0.8%. If a user registers with a password
“ddd” and then attempts to login with the previous three passwords
then Ψu will be set to 0.055 = 0.03 + 0.017 + 0.008.
Each time the user (or attacker) attempts to login with a pass-
word pw the response will either be (1) “locked” if Ψu ≥ Ψ or if
1For example, the user might be asked to resetting his password via e-mail or wait for
some fixed amount of time. In some settings the user might simply be asked to solve a
CAPTCHA challenge. The latter approach has some usability advantages and security
drawbacks e.g., a malicious password might pay to solve the CAPTCHA challenges so
that he can continue attempting to guess the user’s password
Ku ≥ K , (2) “correct” if the the guessed password matches the user
password i.e., pw = pwu 2 or (3) “incorrect password” otherwise. We
demonstrate the login flow in Algorithm 1, Appendix. We remark
that the authentication server could intentionally blur this distinc-
tion between cases (1) and (3), but that this comes at a usability
cost e.g., an honest user would be annoyed if they were repeatedly
informed that their password is incorrect whenever the account is
actually locked.
Remark: One could optionally consider initializing the hit count
parameter Ψu based on the strength of the user’s password. For
example, if u registers with a weak password then we might ini-
tialize Ψu = Ψ/2 for stronger protection i.e., so that the account is
locked down faster. Similarly, a user with a strong password might
be awarded by setting Ψu = Ψ. However, because Ψu and Ku are
stored on the authentication server this would leak information
about the strength of pwu to an offline attacker e.g., if an offline
attacker sees that Ψu = Ψ/2 he might reasonably infer that the user
picked a weak password. 3
4.2 DALock Authentication Server
To implement DALock we need an efficient way to estimate the
probability p(()pw) of each incorrect password pw . We consider
several instantiations of this frequency oracle. One option is to
use password strength meters such as ZXCVBN or more sophisti-
cated password cracking models e.g., Markov Models, Probabilistic
Context Free Grammars, or Neural Networks. Another naive ap-
proach would be to simply maintain a plaintext list of all user
passwords along with their frequencies. However, this approach
is inadvisable due to the risk of leaking this plaintext list. Herley
and Schechter [41] proposed the use of the Count-Sketch data-
structure which would allow us to estimate the frequency of each
password without explicitly storing a plaintext list although there
are no formal privacy guarantees to this approach. We chose to
adopt a Differentially Private Count-Median-Sketch. The authenti-
cation server initializes the Count-Sketch σdp ←DP(ϵ,σ ) by adding
Laplace Noise to preserve ϵ-differential privacy and each time a
new user u registers a new password pwu would be added to the
Count Sketch.
We remark thatmaintaining aDifferentially Private Count-Sketch
has many other potentially beneficial applications e.g., one could
use the Count-Sketch to ban weak passwords [41] and/or to help
identify IP addresses associated with malicious online attacks [56].
One disadvantage is that the attacker will also be able to view the
Count-Sketch data-structure if the data-structure is leaked. The us-
age of differential privacy helps to minimize these risks. Intuitively,
differential privacy hides the influence of any individual password
ensuring that an attacker will not be able to use the Count-Sketch
data-structure to help identify any unique passwords. However, an
attacker may still be able to use the data-structure to learn that a
2To ease presentation we omit the description of the password hashing algorithm
when we describe the authentication server. In practice, we recommend that the
authentication server only stores salted password hashes using a moderately expensive
key derivation function to increase guessing costs for an offline attacker.
3One could potentially avoid storing Ψu unencrypted if one is willing to implement a
silent lockout policy where the user cannot distinguish between an incorrect guess
and a locked account, but we wish to avoid solutions that blur this distinction.
particular password is globally popular (without linking that pass-
word to a particular user). We argue that this is not a major risk as
most attackers will already know about globally popular passwords
e.g., from prior breaches.
5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We evaluate the performance of DALock through an extensive bat-
tery of empirical simulations. In this section we describe the model-
ing choices we made when designing our experiments. To simulate
the authentication ecoystem we need to simulate the behavior of
honest users, the authentication server running DALock and an
online attacker.
Briefly, when simulating users we need to model the distribution
over user passwords, the distribution over honest login mistakes
(e.g., typos or recall errors) as well as the user’s login schedule.
When simulating the distribution over user passwords we use three
empirical datasets (RockYou, Yahoo!, and LinkedIn) to define the un-
derlying password distribution. We use a Poisson arrival process to
model the frequency of user login attempts [1]. Our model for user
mistakes is informed by recent empirical studies of password ty-
pos [11, 12] and is augmented to simulate other mistakes i.e., recall
errors. The key question to answer for simulating an authentica-
tion server runningDALock is how the (password) frequency oracle
p(·) is implemented. We consider two concrete implementations:
password strength models (e.g., ZXCVBN, Markov Models, Neural
Networks) and (differentially private) count sketch. When simulat-
ing the attacker we consider an untargetted one who knows the
distribution over user passwords as well as the DALock mechanism
— including the frequency oracle p(·) . We leave the question of
tuning DALock to protect against targetted online attackers [53] as
an important direction for future research. We elaborate on each of
these key model components below. We begin by with an overview
of the empirical datasets DU that we used in our experiments.
5.1 Experimental Datasets
In this work we use three publicly available password datasets:
LinkedIn[31], RockYou[39], and Yahoo[2, 5]. In addition, we con-
struct datasets via subsampling and password banning mentioned
in section 5.3. We summarize the characteristics of datasets in
Table 2 to help reader catch the essence.
RockYou[39] is a plaintext password corpus contains 14,341,564
unique passwords from a data leakage in 2009. RockYou stored
user data in unencrypted database and leaked the passwords due
to SQL-injection attacks.
LinkedIn[31] is a plaintext password corpus (partially) recov-
ered constructed from a leakage in 2012. While the passwords were
originally hashed LinkedIn was using a weak (unsalted) password
hashing algorithm and almost all of the passwords in the dataset
have been cracked. The dataset we used has approximately 68 mil-
lion passwords. We remark that the actual size of the leak is larger
and that there is a larger (differentially private) frequency corpus
based on 174+ million LinkedIn passwords [24] that is publicly
available. However, this dataset does not include any plaintext pass-
words. We chose to use the smaller dataset in our experiments so
that we could evaluate with frequency oracles based on password
models (e.g., ZXCVBN, PCFGs, Neural Networks).
Yahoo! The Yahoo! frequency corpus is a sanitized password
frequency dataset collected [5] with permission from Yahoo! It
consists of anonymized password histograms representing almost
70 million Yahoo! users who logged into their account during a
48 hour window in May, 2011. Yahoo! later authorized the public
release of a differentially private version of this dataset [2]. We
remark that this frequency corpus does not contain any plaintext
passwords so we did not use password strength models in our
experiments involving the Yahoo! dataset.
Dataset Unique Passwords Accounts P (pw1)
LinkedIn 6,840,885 68,361,064 1.53%
Yahoo 33,895,873 69,301,337 1.1%
RockYou 14,341,564 32,603,388 0.89%
Table 2: Summary of dataset
Remark: In this work, we assume each dataset (approximately)
reflects the actual distribution due to their tremendous size. To ease
presentation, we refer “actual distribution" to the datasets described
in this section. We do acknowledge there could be misalignment
between the above ones and their undelying true distributions.
But we focus on analyzing popular passwords where empirical
distribution and the real distribution will be very similar.
Ethics Some of the datasets we used (LinkedIn[31] and RockYou[39])
contain passwords that were previously stolen and subsequently
leaked online. The use of this data raises important ethical consid-
erations. We remark that the password lists are already publicly
available online so our use of the data does not exacerbate the
prior harm to users. We did not crack any new user passwords.
Furthermore, the data we use has been cleaned of all identifying
information beyond the passwords themselves. In summary, we
believe that our use of the leaked data will not exacerbate prior
harm to users, and that the lockout mechanism we develop and
evaluate may help to protect user passwords in the future.
5.2 Modeling Users
Our model to simulate the behavior of honest users consists of
three key components: user password selection, login frequency,
and mistake model.
5.2.1 Simulating Users’ Choice of Password. In each simulation
we fix a dataset which is used to simulate user password selec-
tion. We use three large empirical password datasets: RockYou,
LinkedIn and Yahoo! In particular, a dataset consists of a multiset
DU = pw1, ...,pwN of N user passwords which can be compressed
into pairs (pw, F (pw,DU )) — recall that F (pw,DU ) denotes the
number of time the password pw occurs in the dataset DU . See
Section 5.2.1 for a more details about each dataset. Each of these
datasetsDU induces an empirical distribution over user passwords
where the probability of sampling each password pw is simply
F (pw,DU ) /N 4. Each simulated user u in our experiment samples
6 passwords from this empirical distribution and registers with the
first password. Intuitively, the five extra sampled passwords will
4In our analysis we will assume that the empirical distribution is the real distribution
over user passwords and which is also known to the attacker. Given a password
datÆŠaset DU sampled from the real distribution over user passwords we remark
that when analyzing online attacks we focus on popular passwords where empirical
distribution and the real distribution will be very similar.
be used to help simulate recall errors e.g., they represent the user’s
passwords for other websites.
We remark that the Yahoo! dataset [2, 5] only contains frequen-
cies without actual passwords i.e., instead of recording the pair
(pw, F (pw,DU )) the dataset simply records F (pw,DU ) . We gen-
erate a complete password dataset by designating a unique string for
each password. As we avoid using password models like ZXCVBN
to analyze DALock with the Yahoo! dataset since frequency esti-
mation requires accesss to the original passwords. However, we
are still able to evaluate DALock with the Yahoo! dataset using the
Count-Sketch frequency oracle.
Banlists We additionally consider the setting where the authenti-
cation server chooses to ban users from selecting the top B pass-
words e.g., B = 104 passwords. We use the normalized probabilities
model [4] to simulate user password selection under such restric-
tions. In this model we simply use rejection sampling to avoid
sampling one of the top B passwords. Equivalently, we can let
DU,B denote the datasetDU with the B most common passwords
removed and sample from the empirical distribution corresponding
to the updated dataset DU,B .
5.2.2 Simulating user’s login patterns. To simulate each user we
need tomodel the frequencywith which our honest user attempts to
login to the authentication server. In particular, we aim to simulate
the login behavior over a 180 day time span. For each user u we
want to generate a sequence 0 < tu1 < t
u
2 < · · · < 4320 = 180 × 24
where each tui ∈ N represents the time (hour) of the ith user visit.
Following prior work (e.g., see [1, 28]) we use a Poisson arrival
process to generate these login times. The Poissuon arrival process
is parameterized by an arrival rate Tu (hours) which encodes the
expected time between consecutive login attemptsTu = E[ti+1−ti ],
and the arrival process is memoryless so the actual gap ti+1 − ti
is independent of ti . Since some users are more active than others
we pick a different arrival rate Tu for each user u where each Tu is
sampled uniformly random from {12, 24, 24× 3, 24× 7, 24× 14, 24×
30}. The parameter Tu = 12 (hours) corresponds to users who visit
multiple times per day on average, while the parameterTu = 24×30
corresponds to a user who visits the site once per month. For each
user u we use the Poisson arrival process with parameter Tu to
generate the sequence of visits 0 < tu1 < t
u
2 < · · · < 4320 = 180×24
over a time span of 180 days (4320 hours). Each time a user visits
we assume that they will continue attempting to login until they
succeed or get locked out.
We remark that we do not simulate a client device which auto-
matically attempts to login on the user’s behalf. It may be desirable
to have the authentication server store the (salted) hash of the user’s
previous password(s) so that we can avoid locking the user’s ac-
count in settings where a client device might repeatedly attempt to
login with an outdated password. Alternatively, the authentication
server could store an encrypted cache of incorrect login attempts
using public key cryptography where each incorrect login attempt
pw ′u , pwu would be encrypted with a public key pku and stored
on the authentication server. The encrypted cache could only be
decrypted when the user authenticates with the correct password5.
The encrypted cache could be used as part of a personalized typo
5Unlike the public encryption key pku , which would be stored on the authentication
server, the secret key sku would only be stored in encrypted form i.e., the server
corrector [12] and could also be used to avoid penalizing repeat
mistakes [12, 56]. One potential downside to this approach is that
the cache might inadvertantly contain credentials from other user
accounts making cached data valuable to the attacker. More empir-
ical study would be needed to determine the risks and benefits of
maintaining such a cache.
5.2.3 Simulating User Mistakes. The last component of our user
model is a mechanism to simulate user mistakes during the authen-
tication process. Our model relies upon recent empirical studies of
password typos [11, 12] and additionally incorporates other com-
mon user mistakes e.g., recall errors. The aforementioned studies
show that roughly 7.5% of login attempts are mistakes and at least
68% of these mistakes are (most likely) typos i.e., within edit dis-
tance 2 of the original passwords. Accordingly, we set the mistake
rate to be 7.5% for simulation. When simulating each login attempt
the user will enter the correct password with probability 92.5%.
Otherwise, if the user makes a mistake we simulate a typo with
probability 68% and we simulate a recall error with probably 32%.
To simulate a recall error we randomly select one of the user’s
five alternate passwords to model a user who forgot which of his
passwords was associated with this particular account — if the
user recalls the wrong password they might additionally miss-type
it (with probability 0.075 · 0.68). We refer an interested reader to
the appendix for a more detailed discussion of our mistake model
including a flow chart (see Figure 9) and more finegrained typo
statistics (see Table 3).
We remark that we do not attempt to simulate a user who com-
pletely forgets his password. Of course we expect that this will
occasionally happen in reality. However, we observe that a user
who forgets his password will always need to reset it regardless of
the throttling mechanism adopted by the authentication server.
5.3 Modeling the Authentication Server
We model an authentication server running DALock with vari-
ous parameters K and Ψ for the strike count and hit count. Each
time a user u (or attacker pretending to be u) attempts to login
the authentication server updates the parameters Ψu and Ku ac-
cordingly following the DALockmechanism. We remark that when
Ψ = ∞ that the authentication server is running the classical K-
strikes lockout policy. To deploy DALock with a finite hitcount
parameter Ψ an authentication server needs to use a frequency
oracle to update the hit count after each incorrect login attempt. In
this work we consider two concrete approaches the authentication
server might adopt: (differentially private) Count Sketch estima-
tor and Password Strength Models. We use p(pw, Estimator) to
denote the estimated popularity (probability) of a password pw us-
ing the estimator Estimator e.g., given a Count-Sketch σ we would
use p(pw,σ ) = Estimate(pw,σ )TotalFreq(σ ) . We remark that the authentication
server might (optionally) chose to ban overly popular passwords to
flatten the password distribution to protect user accounts against
online attackers [41]. If the authentication server adopts such a pol-
icy then the frequency oracle would need to be adjusted accordingly
to model the new password distribution.
would store cu = EncKu (sku ) where Ku = KDF(pwu ) is a symmetric encryption
key derived from the user’s password.
5.3.1 Differentially Private Count Sketch Estimator. The first in-
stantiation of p(·, ·)we consider is to build a Count Sketch Estimator
σDU = Add(DU ,σ ) from our dataset DU of user passwords. To
build a Count Sketch in practice the authentication server would
update the Count Sketch with the new password each time a user
registers 6. There are several issues to consider when deploying the
Count Sketch estimator: memory efficiency, privacy, sample size
and accuracy.
Memory EfficiencyWe instantate the Count Sketch with pa-
rametersd = 5 andw = 106 so that the entire datastructure requires
just 20 MB of space which easily fits in RAM.
Privacy As we discussed earlier one concern about storing a
Count Sketch σDU on the authentication server is that an offline at-
tacker might steal this file and use the data-structure to help identify
user passwords. For example, if our user John Smith selects (resp.
does not select) the password “J.S.UsesStr0ngpwd!” then we would
expect that the true frequency of this password is F (pw,DU ) = 1
(resp. F (pw,DU ) = 0). If the Count Sketch estimator is overly ac-
curate then the attacker would be able to learn that one user (most
likely John Smith) picked this password. Without a way to address
these privacy concerns an organization might be understadibly
wary to deploy a Count Sketch estimator.
To address these privacy concerns we consider an ϵ- differen-
tially private estimator σdp = DP(ϵ,σ ) in our experiments. During
initialization we add laplace noise to each of the cells in the Count
Sketch where the noise parameter scales with d/ϵ . In our above
example, differential privacy ensures that — up to a multiplicative
advantage eϵ — an attacker cannot use the count sketch to distin-
guish between a dataset in which John Smith did (resp. did not) pick
the password “J.S.UsesStr0ngpwd!’ We remark that lower values of
ϵ correspond to stronger privacy guarantees e.g., we use ϵ = ∞ to
denote the case with no differential privacy guarantees. In most of
our experiments we use a small privacy parameter ϵ = 0.1 which
is much smaller than the privacy parameters used in most prior
deployments of differential privacy e.g., [2, 16, 43].
Sample Size and Accuracy In general the accuracy of a Count
Sketch increases with the size of the password dataset. Suppose
that the organization does not have millions of users or the that
the sample size is decreased because the organization allows users
to “opt-in” to the (differentially private) count sketch. One natural
question is whether a smaller organization would be able to deploy
a Count Sketch to obtain reliable frequency estimates. We inves-
tigate this question by subsampling smaller datasets to train the
Count Sketch. Given a setU of N users we useUr% to denote a
randomly subsampled set of r% of users. We useDUr% to denote the
corresponding subsampled password dataset σr% = Add(DU ,σ )
to denote the Count Sketch trained on the subsampled data. The
question is whether σr% can be as effective as σ for deploying
DALock.
In our experiments we consider the following sampling rates: 1%,
5%, and 10%. We find that even when r = 1% the Count Sketch CS
trained on DU1% is sufficiently accurate — even if we additionally
add laplace noise to preserve ϵ = 0.1-differential privacy.
6The Count Sketch instantiations we consider would also support a Remove operation
which would allow the authentication server to handle password updates efficiently
Count Sketch with Banlists In our simulations we also con-
sider an authentication server that bans the most popular B = 104
passwords in a dataset to help flatten the password distribution
and protect users against online attacks. Theoretical anaylsis indi-
cates that directly banning the most popular passwords is the most
effective way to increase the minimum entropy of the password
distribution [4]. We remark that one additional benefit of using a
Count Sketch datastructure is that it can be used to help implement
this type of policy i.e., if a user attempts to register with password
pw and p(pw,σ ) is already too high then the user will be required
to pick a different password [41].
We evaluate the performance of DALock in the presence of ban-
lists. Recall that we let DU,B denote the dataset DU with the B
most common passwords removed following the normalized proba-
bilities model of [4] to model how affected users will update their
passwords in response to the banlist. In particular, we assume users
who are affected by the policy will pick a new passwords following
the empirical distribution induced by DU,B . We then train the
Count Sketch on the updated dataset i.e., σ−B = Add(DU,B ) as
follows.
5.3.2 Frequency Oracle from PasswordModels. Aswe previously
discussed there are several reasons why an organization might pre-
fer not to use a Count Sketch for frequency estimation e.g., privacy
concerns or limited sample size. An alternative is to instantiate the
frequency oracle with a password model. This could be a heuristic
password strength meter, a more sophisticated model based on
Neural Networks, Probabilistic Context Free Grammars or Markov
Models or an empirical estimate based on Hashcat. The primary
advantage to this approach is that the model can be deployed im-
mediately even before an organization has any users and there are
no privacy concerns.
We adopted the ZXCVBN password strength meter [54] as prior
empirical studies demonstrate that it is one of the most accurate
password strength meters [22]. We used the Password Guessing
Service [47] to obtain guessing numbers for Neural Network, PCFG,
Hashcat, and Markov Models — we also considered the minimum
guessing number across all four models as suggested in [47]. For
example, if a password pw had guessing number д we might esti-
mate that p(pwi ) = 1/д. One challenge that we needed to address
was that the estimates we obtain do not always yield a probability
distribution e.g., for ZXCVBN we have
∑10000
i=1 p(pwi ) ≫ 1 where
i ranges over the top 104 passwords in the dataset. Thus, before
deploying the frequency estimator in DALock we renormalized our
estimates so that
∑10000
i=1 p(pwi ) = 1.
5.4 Modeling the Attacker
The final component of our simulation is a model of the attacker.
We take a conservative approach and model an untargetted attacker
with complete knowledge of the password distribution. Following
Kerckhoff’s principle we also assume that the attacker has access to
the complete description of the DALock mechanism. In particular,
for any password pw we assume that the attacker knows both the
true probability P (pw) and the estimated probability p(pw). Finally,
we also assume that the attacker is given the complete sequence
of login times tu1 ≤ tu2 ≤ . . . ≤ 24 × 180 for each user u over a 180
day time span as well as the outcome of each login attempt e.g., at
time tui user u will succeed after 2 incorrect guesses.
Remark:We conservatively aim to overestimate the capabilities
of an untargetted online attacker. In practice, the online attacker
will be able to able to approximate P (pw) and p(pw) overtime
by interacting with the DALock server e.g., by setting up dummy
accounts to test many times he can submit a particular incorrect
guess without exceeding the hit count. Similarly, the attacker would
not necessarily know the exact login times for a user, but this
conservative assumption makes it feasible to precisely characterize
the optimal behavior of an attacker. In practice, an online attacker
might wait several days in between guesses to avoid accidently
locking the user’s account based on the number of consecutive
incorrect login attempts.
5.4.1 Optimizing Attack Strategies. The goal of the attacker is
to maximize the probability of cracking each password within the
fixed 180 day time span. For example, the attacker might try to find
popular passwords pw where the ratio p(pw)/P (pw) is small so
that the increased hit count is smaller than intended. We formalize
the attacker’s optimal strategy in terms of the Password Knapsack
problem (PK). Unsurprisingly, the password knapsack probelm
turns out to be NP-hard (as we prove in the appendix), but there
are several heuristic algorithms the A can use which yield nearly
optimal strategies in practice.
Recall that we assume that the A has perfect knowledge of the
distribution and probability estimates for each password pw . We
also assume A knows the DALock security parameters K and Ψ.
Furthermore, for each user u we assume that the attacker is given
the complete sequence of login times tu1 ≤ tu2 ≤ . . . ≤ 24 × 180
for each user u over a 180 day time span as well as the outcome
of each login attempt e.g., at time tui user u will succeed after 2
incorrect guesses. In particular, at any point in time t < 24 × 180
the attacker can infer the current strike threshold and hit count
threshold for any user u. We denote by Ku,t (resp. Ψu,t ) the strike
(resp. hit count) threshold for user u at time t assuming that the
attacker does not submit any of his own guesses.
Supposing that the attacker wishes to avoid locking down the
user’s account before time t the cummulative (estimated) probability
of all guesses submitted before that time should be at most Ψ′u,t :=
Ψ − Ψu,t . Similarly, we let M(t) denote the maximum number of
gueses that the attacker can sneak in over the first t hours without
locking down the account i.e., because Ku,t ′ ≥ K at some time
t ′ ≤ t .
Fixing the time parameter t the attacker’s goal is to find a subset
St ⊆ P ofM(t) passwords to check such that∑
pw ∈St
p(pw) ≤ Ψ′u,t . (1)
After checking the passwords in St the attacker can still check one
more password pwhold < St before the account is locked down.
Given a set St and a holdout password pwhold < St the probability
that the attacker succeeds is
P (pwhold ) +
∑
pw ∈St
P (pw) . (2)
Thus, the goal of the attacker is to find a subset St of size |St | ≤
M(t) maximizing his success rate (eq 2) subject to the constaint in
equation 1.
Password Knapsack Problem Given a password dictionary
{pw1, . . . ,pwn } we formally define the Password Knapsack(PK)
problem as the following integer program with indicator variables
si ∈ {0, 1} and li = {0, 1} for each password pwi . The attackers
goal is to select a holdout password and a separate subset of M
(= M(t)) passwords with total ‘weight’ (estimated probability) at
most Ψ′ (= Ψ′u,t )
max
∑
i
(si + li ) · P (pwi )
subject to, ∑
i si · p(pwi ,σ )) ≤ Ψ′∑
i si ≤ M∑
i li ≤ 1
∀i li + si ≤ 1
where,
∀i, si , li ∈ {0, 1}
Intutively, setting si = 1 means pwi is selected to be placed in the
“password knapsack" S ⊆ P, i.e. to be used for dictionary attack.
Setting li = 1 indicates that password pwi is used as holdout pass-
word. This is equivalent to the following optimization problem. The
constraints ensure that |S | ≤ M and we pick exactly one holdout
password that is not already in S .
Solving the Password Knapsack To maximize the number of
cracked passwords an online attacker can computeM(t) andΨ′u,t :=
Ψ − Ψu,t for each time t ≤ 24 × 180 and solve the corresponding
PasswordKnapsack problem. Given optimal solutions (pw∗hold,t , S∗t )
for each time t the attacker will pick the solution that maximizes
the number of cracked passwords as in equation 2. We remark that
the calculations above need to be repeated for each different user u
since the valuesM(t) and Ψ′u,t may vary due to different visitation
schedules.
SolvingPasswordKnapsack Unfortunately, the PasswordKnapsack
problem is NP-hard as we prove in Theorem A.1 in the Appendix
via a straightforward reduction from Subset Sum. In all of instances
we considered we found that the optimal choice for the holdout
password was simply pw1 the most likely password in the distri-
bution. Once we fix our holdout password our problem reduces to
the two dimensional knapsack problem. We remark that PK can be
viewed as a two dimensional knapsack problem.
Assuming P , NP the two dimensional knapsack probelm does
not even admit a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS)
[30] in contrast to the regular knapsack problem which has fully
polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS)). Thus, we con-
sider two heuristic approaches to solve the password knapsack prob-
lem: Dantizig’s Algorithm Based[14] approach (DAB) and Feasible
Most Promising Password First approach(FMPPF).
DAB (Algorithm 2, Appendix) sorts the remaining passwords
PΠ˜ = {pw2, . . . pwn } based on the ratios
P(pwi )
p(pwi ) and select candi-
dates based on the sorted order until we either selectM passwords
or until selecting another password would exceed our capacity Ψ′.
FMPPF (Algorithm 3, Appendix) sorts the remaining passwords
based on the true probability P (pwi ) and simply selects password
pw in sorted order until we either selectM passwords or until select-
ing another password would exceed our capacity Ψ′. We discuss the
advantages and disadvantages to both heuristics in the appendix.
Intuitively, FMPPF (resp. DAB) will perform better whenM (resp.
Ψ′) is the limiting constraint.
We found that FMPPF generally performs better than DAB de-
spite of its simplicity. In addition, our simuation shows that FMPPF’s
performance is close to optimal. Practically speaking, one generally
expect p(pwi ) ≈ P (pwi ) especially when pwi is a popular password.
In such case, DAB can hardly gain advantages from underestima-
tion. Further more, imagine one bucket passwords by probability
ranges, there are plenty of passwords in each bucket. Intuitively,
picking passwords ordered by P (pwi ) should produce an (almost)
optimal solution (quickly). Thus, we choose to present the results
based on FMPPF approach.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We empirically evaluated the performance of DALock under a vari-
ety of scenarios. During each simulation we had 106 honest users
register with an authentication server running DALock and login
over a period of 180 days. To analyze usability we ran the sim-
ulations without an online password attacker and measured the
unwanted lockout rate i.e., the fraction of user accounts that were
locked due to honest mistakes. To analyze security we added an
untargetted online attacker to the simulation and measured the
fraction of user passwords that the attacker cracked.
The results of our simulations are summarized in Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
and 87. The first four figures evaluate the security (Figures 3 and 5)
and usability (Figures 4 and 6) in the absence of a banlist. The last
two figures evaluate the usability (Figure 8 ) and security (Figure 7
) of DALock when the authentication server bans the top B = 104
passwords in our dataset. The X-axis of each plot represents the
time span over 180 days. And the Y-axis represents percentage of
compromised users (unwanted locked out rate) for security (usabil-
ity) experiments.
ImplementationDetails In each of our implementationsDALock
we instantiatedK = 10 using hit count parametersΨ ∈ {2−7.0, 2−9.375}
(no banlist) and Ψ = 2−11 (with banlist). In each batch of experi-
ments we used one of our three password datsets DU (RockYou,
Yahoo!, or LinkedIn) to define our password distribution and we
instantiated the frequency oracle using (1) a variety of password
models including ZXCVBN [54], Hashcat, Markov Models, PCFGs
and Neural Networks [47]8 and (2) an ϵ-differentially private count
sketch trained on a subsample DUr% of containing r% of the orig-
inal dataset DU with r ∈ {1%, 5%, 10%, All}. When instantiated
7We included additional experimental results in Appendix C for interested readers.
8We relied on the Password Guessing Service to obtain cracking numbers for Hashcat,
Markov Models, PCFGs and Neural Networks [47]. We found that the Neural Network
model failed to crack many weak passwords in our datasets as it was configured not to
guess short passwords. As such we did not directly use Neural Networks to implement
our frequency oracle. However, the Neural Network guessing numbers are included
in our Min-all frequency oracle which uses the minimum guessing number over all
models.
with banlist we used the dataset DU,B instead of DU i.e., we
removing the B = 104 most common passwords.
Baseline We used the classical 3-strike mechanism and the 10-
strike mechanisms (recommend by Brostoff et. al [7] to improve
usability) as a baseline for comparison. We remark that this is equiv-
alent to (3,Ψ = ∞)-DALock and (10,Ψ = ∞)-DALock respectively.
Our results suggest that one can improve both security and us-
ability by replacing the classic 3-strike throttling mechanism with
(10,Ψ) − DALock. Our results demonstrate that (10,Ψ)-DALock
greatly outperforms the classic 10-strikes throttling mechanism
without significant usability loss – from a usability standpoint de-
creasing Ψ can only increase the unwanted lockout rate. We discuss
our findings in more detail below.
6.1 Usability
Figures 4 and 6 highlight the usability of DALock in the absence
of a banlist with hit count parameters Ψ = 2−9.375 and Ψ = 2−7.0.
When Ψ = 2−7.0 we find that DALock always outperforms the
classical 3-strikes mechanism regardless of how the frequency or-
acle is instantiated. When Ψ = 2−9.375 DALock still outperforms
the classical 3-strikes mechanism when instantiated with a count-
sketch — even when we train on just r = 1% of the dataset and
add laplace noise to achieve ϵ = 0.1-differential privacy. When we
instantiate DALock password models the results were mixed e.g.,
ZXCVBN and Hashcat had superior usability while Markov Models
and Probabilistic Context Free Grammars performed poorly.
Figure 8 highlights the usability benefit of banning the top 104
passwords. While a few users might be inconvenienced during the
password registration our simulations indicate that the unwanted
lockout rates forDALock are greatly reduced even when we adopt a
stricter Ψ = 2−11. Intuitively, the banlist allows us to avoid locking
out users who select and overly popular password as one of their
five alternate passwords for other accounts. We remark that when
we instantiateDALockwith a count sketch that the usability results
are virtually identical to the 10-strikes policy — even if we use a
ϵ = 0.1 -differentially private count sketch trained on just 1% of the
data.
10-strike Mechanism is user friendly Brostoff et. al [7] pro-
posed that one should replace 3-strike mechanism with 10-strike
mechanism to achieve higher usability. Our simulation results
clearly align with their recommendations. Based on our plots, 10-
strike mechanism results in unwanted locked out rate close to zero.
However, deploying this mechanism also has a high security cost
as indicated by our simulations.
6.2 Security Results
Figures 3 and 5 evaluate the security of DALock in the absence
of a banlist with hit count parameters Ψ = 2−9.375 and Ψ = 2−7
respectively. For reference we also plotted the line Ψ + P (()pw1)
which constitutes a theoretical upper bound on the attacker suc-
cess rate when DALock is instantiated with a perfect frequency
oracle. We found that DALock always outperforms even the stricter
K = 3-strikes policy under all insantiations of the frequency ora-
cle (excluding Hashcat with Ψ = 2−7). For example, the attacker
Figure 3: Security Measurement of DALock - Ψ = 2−9.375
Figure 4: Usability Measurement of DALock - Ψ = 2−9.375
Figure 5: Security Measurement of DALock - Ψ = 2−7.0
Figure 6: Usability Measurement of DALock - Ψ = 2−7.0
Figure 7: Security Measurement of DALock - Ψ = 2−11 (Banning top B = 104 passwords)
Figure 8: Usability Measurement of DALock - Ψ = 2−11 (Banning top B = 104 passwords)
cracked roughly 4% of users accounts when facing 3-strike mech-
anism (LinkedIn + RockYou) compared with 2% when deploying
DALock with a differentially private count sketch.
Figure 7 highlights the advantage of banning the most popular
B = 104 passwords. We remark that DALock always outperformed
the K = 10-strikes policy. We also found that the K = 3-strikes
policy andDALock (with a differentially private Count Sketch) were
both highly effective at protecting user accountswith a compromised
rate is about close to zero. ( ≈ 0.092% for 3-strike and ≈ 0.048% for
differential private Count Sketch).
6.3 Summary and Discussion
We find that (10,Ψ)-DALock offers a superior security/usability
tradeoff to the classical K-strikes mechanism. Our experiments also
highlight the security and usability benefits of banning overly pop-
ular passwords. We found that DALock can be reasonably instan-
tiated with password strength models such as ZXCVBN, Markov
Models, Probabilistic Context Free Grammars and Neural Networks.
However, we obtain the best security/usability tradeoffs when we
ban the most popular passwords and when we instantiate the
DALock frequency oracle with a differentially private count sketch.
We found that the count sketch can be reliable trained from a
smaller subsample containing just 1% of the dataset, and even if we
add enough noise to preserve ϵ − 0.1-differential privacy (strong
privacy). This is promising news for a smaller organization that is
considering deploying DALock.
Limitations Our empirical security results are all based on sim-
ulations. While we aim to model the authentication server, users
and an attacker there will inevitably be some differences between
the simulated/real-world behavior of the attacker/users. We also
remark that our simulations do not model the behavior of targetted
attackers. Extending DALock to protect against targetted attackers
is an important research question that is beyond the scope of the
current paper. Finally, we remark that larger organizations might
distribute the workload across multiple authentication servers. In
this case maintaining a synchronized state (Ku ,Ψu ) for each user u
could be challenging. To address this challenge it may be necessary
to define a relaxation of our DALock mechanism where the states
(Ku ,Ψu ) on each authentication server are not always assumed to
be perfectly synchronized.
7 CONCLUSION
We present a novel distribution aware password throttling mecha-
nism DALock that penalizes incorrect passwords proportionally to
their popularity. We show that DALock can be reliably instantiated
with either a password strength model such as ZXCVBN or with a
differentially private count sketch. Our empirical analysis demon-
strates that DALock offers a superior balance between security and
usability and is particularly effective when used in combination
with a short banlist of overly popular passwords. For example, we
are able to reduce the success rate of an attacker to 0.05% (compared
to 1% for the 10-strikes mechanism) whilst simultaneously reducing
the unwanted lockout rate to just 0.08% (compared to 4% for the
3-strikes mechanism).
A DALOCK
A.1 DALock Authentication Algorithm
We supplement the pseudo code of DALock in this section to help
readers understand how to implement DALock for authencation.
The authencation process takes four arguments: username u, input
password pw , salt su , and password popularity estimator σ . Before
verifying the correctness of entered password, DALock first check
if u’s account has already been locked or not based on Ψu and
Ku. If the account is not locked, DALock proceeds and verify the
correctness of the passwords. If the password is valid, DALock
resets strike threshold Ku and grant user the access to the service.
If the entered password is wrong then in addition to denying the
access to the service, the server also increases Ψu and K by p(pw)
and 1 respectively.
Algorithm 1 DALock: Novel Password Distribution Aware Throt-
tling Mechanism
1: function login(u, pwu , σ ,su )
2: if Ψu ≥ Ψ or Ku ≥ K then
3: Reject Login
4: end if
5: if hash(pw, su ) == hash(pwu , su ) then
6: Reset Ku to K
7: Grant Access
8: else
9: Ψu ← Ψu + p(pw,σ )
10: Ku ← Ku + 1
11: Deny Access
12: end if
13: end function
A.2 Password Knapsack is NP hard
TheoremA.1 (Hardness of PasswordKnapsack). Find optimal
solution for password knapsack is NP-hard.
Proof: We first formally define subset sum problem, and then
prove password knapsack is NP hard by showing the reduction
from subset sum to it.
Definition A.2 (Subset Sum). Given Partition instancex1, . . . ,xn ∈
(0, 2m ] and target sum value T . The goal is to find S ⊆ [n] s.t.∑
i ∈S xi = T ?
Reduction: One can create the following password knapsack
instance
• Set γ = ∑ni=1 xi ,
• Setψ = T /(2γ ) < 12 ,• Set CS(pi ) = f (pi ) = xi/(2γ ) for i = 1, . . . ,n
• Set f (plast ) = 1 −
∑n
i=1 pi = 1/2 > ψ .
If S exists for partition instance then attacker can use S for password
knapsack to crack plast +T /(2γ ) passwords. On the other hand let S
be the optimal password knapsack solution such that
∑
i ∈S CS(pi ) ≤
ψ then the attacker cracks at most plast +
∑
i ∈S f (pi ) ≤ 1/2 +ψ
passwords. If equality holds then
∑
i ∈S f (pi ) = ψ which implies∑
i ∈S xi = T by definition ofψ .
A.3 Solving PK with Heruistics
In this section we supplement the missing details of algorithm DAB
and FMPPF mentioned in Section 5.4.
The DAB approach takes three inputs: a sorted password dictio-
nary based on the ratio of actual popularity and estimated popu-
larity p(pw )P(pw ) : PΠ˜ = {pwΠ˜(1), . . . ,pwΠ˜(n)}, attack budget Ψ and K.
The algorithm keeps placing passwords into the knapsack S based
on the sorted order until it cannot further add some password pw .
At this points, DAB compares P (pw) with P (S) and sets S to be
the one with higher values. After that, the algorithm repeat the
above process by scanning throught the whole dictionary. At the
end, since only K passwords is allowed to be used for guessing, the
algorithm returns K passwords based on their actual probability
Primary incentives of using this algorithm are 1) to take advan-
tage of underestimated passwords and 2) to avoid (severely) over-
estimated ones. There are several drawbacks of DAB. Firstly, the
progress can be slow because priority are given to significantly un-
derestimated passwords. Intuitively, for popular passwords (P (pw)
large) the ratio P(pw )p(pw ) is likely to be close to 1, therefore, attempts
with popular ones are likely to be delayed. Secondly, unlike vanilla
version of Knaspack, DAB may not yield a 2-approximation due
to the additional constraint on the number of passwords one can
place in the Knapsack. Third, computation cost is slightly higher
for running DAB though both algorithms terminate reasonably
quickly.
Algorithm 2 DAB Attack
Return: An array of password sorted in the order of guessing
1: function DAB Attack(PΠ˜,Ψ,M(T ))
2: S= []
3: while S changes do
4: for pw ∈ PΠ˜ do
5: if p(pw) > Ψ then
6: continue
7: end if
8: if p(S ∪ pw) < Ψ and |S | ≤ M(T ) then
9: S ← S ∪ pw
10: else if P (pw) > P (S) then
11: S ← {p}
12: end if
13: end for
14: end while
15: return Top M(T ) passwords from S based on actual popu-
larity.
16: end function
An alternative to DAB is FMPPF. It takes three input param-
eters P = pw1, . . . ,pwn }, attack budget Ψ and M(T ) and selects
passwords greedily. FMPPF differs from DAB in the following two
aspects. Firstly, FMPPF uses a password dictioary sorted based on
the actual popularity only, which can be easily obtained in reaf
life. Secondly, to save computational cost FMPPF terminates once
it finds K passwords that are suitable for attacks and stop further
explore the dictionary. The pseudo can be found in Algorithm 3
In short time attack scenarios, FMPPF offers better chance of
success than DAB by attempting popular ones first. For long term
case, FMPPF should still be able to achieve almost optimal results
given an abundant choice of passwords. In fact, based on the em-
pirical results (in section 6.2), the performance of FMPPF is very
close to theoretical upper bounds (Ψ + P (pw1) ).
Algorithm 3 FMPPF Approach
Return: An array of password sorted in the order of guessing
1: function FMPPF(P,Ψ,M(T ))
2: S= []
3: for pw ∈ P do
4: if p(S ∪ p) < Ψ and |S | < M(T ) then
5: S ← S ∪ pw
6: end if
7: end for
8: return S
9: end function
B SIMULATING USER’S MISTAKES
In this section we elaborate the details for simulating users’ mis-
takes missing in Section 5.2. To help reader visualize the process of
simulating mistakes, we plot the flowchart in figure 9. The starting
point is to simulate recall errors. Based on the empirical results of
existing literatures[11, 12], we set the probability of makeing an
recall error to 2.4%. Recall that when we generate user’s profile,
each user has five “passwords from other services". Therefore, we
simulate recall error by choose one of them to be the password user
intends to enter. On top of this process, we further simulate typos
(on the password intended to enter) with probability ≈ 5%. Condi-
tion on making typos, we simulate this step by choosing a type of
typos with their conditional probability summarized in Table 3.
Figure 9: Flow Chart for Simulating Users’ mistake
C MORE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We provide more experimental results for curious readers to bet-
ter understand the performance of DALock in multiple scenar-
ios. To clearly demonstrates the impact of Ψ on security and us-
ability we choose to visualize the following set of parameters
{2−6, 2−7, 2−8, 2−9, 2−10}(Figure 10 and 11). When one set Ψ to an
Typo Types Chance of Mistake(Rounded %)
CapLock On 14
Shift First Char 4
One Extra Insertion 12
One Extra Deletion 12
One Char Replacement 31
Transposition 4
Two Deletions 3
Two Insertions 3
Two Replacements 10
Others 8
Table 3: Typo Distributions[12]
over conservative, e.g. 2−10 or smaller, dictionary attackers are not
able to crack a significant potion of users accounst; however, usebil-
ity can be a concern as infrequent passwords burns Ψu quickly.(see
curve CS-all(k : 10,Ψ : 2−10, ϵ) across all figures). Another extreme
approach is adopting aggresively large Ψ, e.g. 2−6. Based on the
plots(curve CS-all(k : 10,Ψ : 2−6, ϵ)), the usability performance is
satisfactory while security risk is enlarged (but still better than 3-
strike). Beyond standard Count Sketch, we supplement more results
on applying differential privacy to Count-Sketch(Figure 12 and 13).
We discovered that differential privacy hardly have any negative
impact on the performance of DALock especially when the dataset
is large. Further more, we supplement more results on subsampling
to show σr% is effective for a wide range of Ψ even when the sam-
pling rate is 1%.(Figure 14 and 15) Finally, we present the results
of differentially private DALock trained on subsampling dataset
DU1% . Despite the datasets become 100 times smaller, DP(σ1%,) still
performs reasonly well.(Figure 16 and 17).
Almost Optimal Heruistic If one assumes that P (pw) ≈ p(pw)
for popular passwords, then theoretically A can compromise at
most Ψ+P (pw1) users accounts by using pw1 as holdout passwords.
Based on our simulation results, we found that A is very close to
achieve such threshold by adopting FMPPF algorithm metioned in
Section 5.4. To help readers identify this property, we highlight
the upperbouds a series of upperbounds(e.g. 2−6 + P (pw1) etc)
Figure 10: Security: σ
Figure 11: Usability: σ
Figure 12: Security: DP(0.1,σ )
Figure 13: Usability: DP(0.1,σ )
Figure 14: Security: σ1%
Figure 15: Usability: σ1%
Figure 16: Security: DP(0.1,σ1%)
Figure 17: Usability:DP(0.1,σ1%)
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